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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy refused to
enroll their children in high school. The parents were tried and convicted of
violating Wisconsin’s compulsory attendance law, which required
schooling until age sixteen, and were fined $5 each. They appealed on the
grounds that the compulsory attendance law, as applied, violated their right
to the free exercise of their religion. The parents were members of
conservative Amish denominations (the Old Order Amish and the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church1), and they insisted that education
beyond the eighth grade was contrary to their religion and way of life. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court found this infringement impermissible and
overturned their conviction.2 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed.3
The Court, per Chief Justice Burger, found that “Old Order Amish
communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and
worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its values
is central to their faith.”4 The Court balanced this belief against the state’s
interest in secondary education5 and concluded that the educational interests
of the state were outweighed by the religious beliefs of the parents. It thus
held that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from
compelling [the parents] to cause their children to attend formal high school
to age 16.”6
Wisconsin v. Yoder presented the Court with a sharp clash between
the state’s interest in social reproduction through education—that is,
society’s interest in using the educational system to perpetuate its collective
way of life among the next generation—and the parents’ interest in religious
reproduction—that is, their interest in passing their religious beliefs on to
their children. This Article will take up the challenge of that clash. I shall
throughout refer to the question of when, if ever, parents have a religious
1

There seems to be some confusion as to which parents belonged to which
denomination. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (“Respondents
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and
respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church.”), with
State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 539 (Wis. 1971) (“The appellants Jonas Yoder, Adin
Yutzy, members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Wallace Miller, a member of the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church ....”).
2
State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. 1971).
3
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4
Id. at 210.
5
Id. at 214.
6
Id. at 234.
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freedom-based claim to exempt their children from part or all of a statemandated educational requirement as “the Yoder question,” but the inquiry
is not focused on the facts of the case itself. Rather, I shall engage with the
competing theories put forward by scholars and judges who believe in a
broad right of religious reproduction, trumping the state’s interest in social
reproduction (“Yoder supporters”) and scholars and judges who believe that
the interest in social reproduction should trump contrary claims by insular
religious groups (“Yoder opponents”). I will suggest that each of the major
competing theories is fundamentally flawed, and I will offer an alternative
analysis based on communitarian and democratic values.
It is especially important that we continue to think through these
issues because Yoder by no means settled the Yoder question. As debates
continue to rage about issues like the teaching of evolution, creationism, or
intelligent design in public schools,7 it remains clear that our society
continues to struggle with the proper line between societal and parental
control over education. It should also be noted that this is an area of
constitutional law in which originalist methodologies give scant
guidance—education was not seen as a state function in the early republic.8
Prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the religion clauses of
the First Amendment applied only to the federal government,9 and
education was certainly not seen as a federal function. Our analysis will
thus have to rely on other interpretive methodologies, including a
consideration of the political values underlying our conceptions of religious
freedom and education.
The democratic-communitarian analysis of the Yoder problem
offered in this Article begins with the communitarian intuition that social
subjects are constituted by multiple sources of value—everything from lowlevel value sources like families and churches to higher-level sources like
political parties and nations—and that a rich diversity of value sources is
important and worth fostering. Totalitarianism, however, can result when
high-level value sources (i.e., those value sources further away from the
individual—for example, political parties, states, nations, and the
international community) become too thick and squeeze out the possibility
7

See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa.
2005); Gertrude Himmelfarb, Monkeys and Morals, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 2005, at 33;
Jodi Rudoren, Ohio Board Undoes Stand on Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at A14.
8
See Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 Y ALE L. & P OL ’Y R EV . 113, 117-27
(1996) (noting that, because it was not expected that the federal government would play a
role in education, founding history gives little guidance on the appropriate application of
the First Amendment to schooling).
9
See generally AKHIL R EED A M A R , THE B ILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 32-45 (noting the federalist contours of the religion clauses).
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of diversity among individual citizens. A proper communitarian theory will
therefore take into account the various competences of different social
institutions to promote the diversity of values that are constitutive of our
subjectivity, while simultaneously bearing in mind that these value sources
ought to be thickest at the lowest levels. This analysis will conclude that
schools are uniquely well situated to promote those values held at the
society-wide level. This will combine with the democratic intuition that, in
a democratic society, decisions about the inculcation of social values can
only legitimately be made by democratic means. The conclusion will be
that parents and courts are unjustified in interfering with social reproduction
through schooling.10
However, the democratic-communitarian analysis produces a
second, equally important conclusion. When making democratic decisions,
the conscientious citizen and legislator are bound to resist totalitarian
tendencies by imposing the minimum restraints necessary to ensure the
transmission of important communal values at each level. In other words,
voters should very seriously consider enacting the kinds of exemptions
sought by Jonas Yoder and his co-defendants, and they should only decide
not to enact those exemptions if they come to the conclusion that the
exemptions will interfere with instruction necessary for the education of
democratic citizens.
This democratic-communitarian theory is best explored against the
background of the competing analyses of the Yoder problem heretofore
offered by scholars. These competing analyses have raised problems and
concerns that must be addressed by any new entrant into the field. This
Article thus begins by responding to each of the four main lines of existing
scholarship on the Yoder question. In Part I, I examine the case from liberal
neutrality against Yoder and the case from liberal neutrality in favor of
Yoder. I conclude that each of these positions is inadequate. The Yoder
10

This conclusion may appear odd to those who see Yoder as a fundamentally
communitarian decision. See, e.g., Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular
Public Education Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of
the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HA W . L. REV . 697, 749 (1997); James D. Gordon III,
Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious Liberty, 74 TEX . L. REV . 1237, 1239 (1996); Robert
Justin Lipkin, Religious Justification in the American Communitarian Republic, 25 CAP.
U.L. RE V . 765 (1996); L. Scott Smith, “Religion-Neutral” Jurisprudence: An
Examination of Its Meanings and End, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 841, 871-72 (2005);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 648, 663
(1993). However, I understand the central insight of communitarianism to be the
recognition that individuals are constituted by multiple value sources and that this diversity
of value sources is worth fostering. On this understanding, communitarianism does not
privilege the local over the global; rather, it recognizes an important place for each. See
infra Section IV.A.
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opponent cannot escape the fact that there is no value-neutral curriculum,
and the Yoder supporter cannot abide the logical consequences of his
position—that all laws, not merely educational ones, should be neutral
among competing conceptions of the good. The arguments from liberal
neutrality are inadequate because they both import other, non-neutral values
sub rosa, in an attempt to make it appear that neutral reflection leads to their
preferred outcome. In Part II, I consider the parentalist case in favor of
Yoder. I reject the parentalist case as incomplete because it fails to consider
the complex web of social relations that constitutes a child’s value set. It is
only by misunderstanding the complexity of social relations that parentalist
theorists can conclude that the parents are the only legitimate source of
values for the child, or that compulsory public schooling will stifle social
dissent. In Part III, I turn to the republican case against Yoder. I conclude
that the republican argument creates unjustified impositions on democratic
decision-making. What it masks as curricular conditions necessary for
democracy are, in fact, simply the entrenchment of the republican’s own
curricular preferences.
With the ground thus cleared and the necessary ideas and objections
on the table, I turn in Part IV to an explication of the democraticcommunitarian alternative. This Part will lay out the communitarian and
democratic insights discussed above and show how they combine to provide
an answer to the Yoder problem. It will then consider objections and
conclude that they do not seriously threaten the democratic-communitarian
analysis.
I. THE INADEQUACY OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY
Advocates of liberal neutrality—the idea that the state must be
neutral among competing conceptions of the good—have come down on
both sides of the Yoder debate. In this Part, I shall demonstrate that liberal
neutrality simply does not work as a grounding for either position. It is
impossible as a grounding for Yoder opponents because there is no valueneutral curriculum. It is impossible for Yoder supporters because, taken
seriously, it would require that religious believers be exempt from all laws
which conflict with their religious beliefs, a position which is incompatible
with any conception of a functioning society under law. Attempts to limit
the principle to a requirement of neutrality among reasonable conceptions
of the good fail because they rely upon thick conceptions of
reasonableness—that is, conceptions based on dominant social norms.
“Reasonableness” thus serves primarily to disguise the underlying judgment
that some conceptions of the good are better than others. This judgment
may be correct, but it is not neutral.
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A. The Inadequacy of Liberal Neutrality for Yoder Opponents
In 1983, the Hawkins County, Tennessee Board of Education
adopted a set of texts published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston designed to
encourage “critical reading.” Soon thereafter, Vicki Frost, a born again
Christian, noticed a short story involving mental telepathy in her daughter’s
sixth grade textbook. At the request of Frost and other parents with
religious objections to the texts, the principals of one middle school and two
elementary schools allowed their children to opt for an alternative reading
program. These students would leave the classroom during reading time
and work in other rooms from older textbooks. However, the School Board
quickly put a stop to this practice and voted unanimously to require all
students to use the Holt texts. Shortly thereafter, fourteen parents and
seventeen children filed suit in federal court, asserting that the School
Board’s action violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of
their religion.11 The district court held for the plaintiffs and entered an
injunction prohibiting the School Board from requiring the students to read
from the Holt texts and ordering that objecting students be excused from the
normal reading class and given space elsewhere to read alternative texts.12
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit
thus faced the question of “whether a governmental requirement that a
person be exposed to ideas he or she finds objectionable on religious
grounds constitutes a burden on the free exercise of that person’s religion as
forbidden by the First Amendment.”13 Chief Judge Lively, for the court,
held that it did not. The court emphasized that “exposure to objectionable
material is what the plaintiffs objected to,”14 because they had not presented
any evidence that students were required to affirm their belief or disbelief of
any ideas or practices mentioned in the texts. The court held that, “The
requirement that students read the assigned materials and attend reading
classes, in the absence of a showing that this participation entailed
affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or performance or nonperformance of a religious exercise or practice, does not place an
unconstitutional burden on the students’ free exercise of religion.”15 It went
on to quote approvingly from a Ninth Circuit opinion to the effect that,
“governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs
11

Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1059-61 (6th Cir.

1987).
12

Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schs., 647 F.Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1065.
13
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do not on that account violate free exercise. An actual burden on the
profession or exercise of religion is required. In short, distinctions must be
drawn between those governmental actions that actually interfere with the
exercise of religion, and those that merely require or result in exposure to
attitudes and outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted by religion.”16 In
essence, mere exposure to ideas cannot possibly “burden” or “interfere
with” the free exercise of religion in the way that forcing a child to engage
in practices inconsistent with her religious belief does.
In a perceptive article, Nomi Maya Stolzenberg has demonstrated
the untenability of this position.17 “Critical reading” and “critical
reasoning” are themselves practices—practices which may conflict with
religious beliefs. Critical reasoning teaches children to weigh different
points of view and to use their cognitive faculties to choose the best one.
The fundamentalist parent might well reply that reasoning about certain
questions is an offensive practice—certain religious commands are meant to
be obeyed, not weighed. The Mozert court argued that there was no burden
on the child’s religious belief because the child “would be free to give the
Biblical interpretation” of material when called on in class.18 As
Stolzenberg aptly retorted, this is “no answer to the parents’ concern that
the students should not be free, but rather should be trained in correct
biblical interpretation.”19 If one’s religious beliefs demand unquestioned
obedience to authority, then critical thinking is clearly a practice which
burdens those beliefs. Having been forced to participate in the activity of
critical thinking, children can no longer offer unquestioned obedience.
Even if they come to the same conclusion, they will have come via a
different route, and that surely has theological implications. The Mozert
court thus “missed the essential point that, to its opponents, the objective
study of religion, and objective approaches to knowledge in general, are
quintessentially secular humanist activities.”20 In short, the idea that there is
such a thing as neutral exposure to an idea is fundamentally incoherent. All
exposure is value-laden, if only with the value that exposure to ideas is
good.
The Mozert case is especially important because one of the leading
liberal opponents of educational religious reproduction makes substantially
similar arguments. In Bruce Ackerman’s theory, the goal of liberal
education is “to provide the child with access to the wide range of cultural
16

Id. at 1068 (quoting Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1544
(9th Cir. 1985)).
17
Stolzenberg, supra note 10.
18
Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
19
Stolzenberg, supra note 10, at 613.
20
Id. at 614.
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materials that he may find useful in developing his own moral ideals and
patterns of life.”21 No one has a right consciously to attempt to instill
beliefs in children.22 First and foremost, this means that we must reject
“any effort by any power holder to inculcate an uncritical acceptance of any
conception of the good life.”23 Instead, “what is required is a cultural
environment in which the child may define his own ideals with a
recognition of the full range of his moral freedom.”24 The confrontation set
up between children and their parents’ way of life is not only to be
accepted; it is to be relished:
It is only by questioning the seeming certainties of his early
moral environment that the child can begin to glimpse the
larger world of value that may be his for the asking. More
generally, the liberal educator’s methods of doubt,
imagination, and independence must necessarily come in
conflict with whatever moral ideals happen to dominate
society at large. It is this unending conflict that makes the
institutionalization of liberal education—in “schools”
relatively insulated from the rest of society—a matter of the
first practical importance.25
Ackerman insists that his vision truly is a neutral one: “the liberal state is
not committed to a system of liberal education because it wishes to
indoctrinate children in one vision of the good rather than another.”26
Just as the Mozert court’s claim to neutrality was a façade hiding
value-laden choices, so too is Ackerman’s. His liberal education rules out
conceptions of the good life that involve unquestioning acceptance of moral
truths. It immerses the child in a universe in which “doubt, imagination,
and independence” are inculcated at every turn—indeed, parents are
expressly forbidden from working at counter-purposes to the liberal
educator.27 That means that the values of obedience to authority,
21

BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 155-56 (1980).
See id. at 139 (“Such horticultural imagery has no place in a liberal theory of
education. We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardners
who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower. A system of
liberal education provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be
theirs—so that, as they approach maturity, they have the cultural materials available to
build lives equal to their evolving conceptions of the good.”).
23
Id. at 163.
24
Id. at 162.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 159.
27
Id. at 156.
22
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unimaginativeness, and dependence are heavily burdened. Ackerman
disguises his value choices behind the language of procedure—his liberal
educator is only teaching children how to think, not what to think. But
methodologies inevitably come laden with substantive implications.
Ackerman cannot escape the fact that his liberal education indoctrinates
children in one vision of the good rather than another.28
Many will no doubt agree with Ackerman’s value choices—that
doubt, imagination, and independence are better values to inculcate than
their opposites. But that is neither here nor there. What is important for our
purposes is that Ackerman’s claim that an education based on these
principles is somehow value-neutral is false. Ackerman’s vision is not
neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Indeed, the lesson to
be drawn from our analysis of Mozert and Ackerman is that no educational
system which aims to curtail parental religious reproduction can truly be
neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Liberal neutrality is an
inadequate basis upon which to attack Yoder. In the next Section, we will
consider whether liberal neutrality can be an adequate basis upon which to
sustain Yoder.
B. The Inadequacy of Liberal Neutrality for Yoder Supporters
Liberal neutrality is inadequate for Yoder supporters because, if
taken seriously, neutrality would require religious exemptions from state
laws against physical abuse—a conclusion even the most staunch advocates
of a neutrality-based approach have been unwilling to embrace. An
example will prove helpful: Female genital mutilation is a horrific
practice.29 Under federal law, the performance of female circumcision on a
minor can result in a prison sentence of up to five years,30 in addition to
whatever penalties apply under state law.31 The federal law explicitly
28

For similar critiques of Ackerman’s claim to educational neutrality, see Stephen
G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 94751 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 179-80.
29
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
that female genital mutilation of minors constitutes “past persecution” for the purposes of
asylum laws).
30
18 U.S.C. § 116(a) (2000).
31
State assault and child abuse statutes would clearly apply. Additionally, many
states have rough counterparts to the federal law discussed here. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 273.4 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-527 (2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34 (West 2005); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTHGEN. § 20-601 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2245 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.85 (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-36-01 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.207 (West 2003); TENN . CODE A NN . § 39-13-110 (West 2005); TEX . HEALTH &
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provides that, “no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on
whom the operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that
person, or any other person, that the operation is required as a matter of
custom or ritual.”32 Plainly, this law is constitutional—indeed, a database
search suggests that it has never even been challenged on the grounds that it
restricts religious liberty.
Richard Garnett suggests that religiously motivated physical abuse
presents an easy case: “We know what physical or medical harm looks
like,” he writes.33 Indeed, “[i]f someone were to assert ... that serious
physical injury or death to a child were not a harm to be avoided (as
opposed to claiming that, even though harmful, it must be accepted
reluctantly), that view could, I think, be ruled out of the conversation as
simply unreasonable.”34 By distinguishing it as an easy case, Garnett
attempts to draw a distinction between physical abuse and fuzzier claims of
civic or educational harm. These latter types of harm are “unavoidably
contested,” according to Garnett, and therefore “should not be a permissible
basis for government intervention or second-guessing.”35 Much will
therefore turn on whether or not Garnett’s distinction holds water.
When Garnett writes that the assertion that physical injury to a child
is not a harm is “simply unreasonable,” he cannot have in mind a standard
“thin” conception of rationality, under which any action which efficiently
conduces to the actor’s desired goal is rational. After all, one can perfectly
plausibly conceive of a situation in which parents believe that circumcising
their daughter (or, for that matter, sacrificing her life) is an affirmative good
because it brings her closer to God. Indeed, one presumes that such parents
would insist that they were not “mutilating,” “injuring,” or “harming” their
daughter—they were enabling her to reach her full potential by fulfilling her
religious roles and duties. Circumcising their daughter may be the most
efficient, or even the only, means of accomplishing this goal—that is, it
may be thinly rational. Garnett, then, must be relying on a thicker
conception of reasonableness, one that implicitly relies on dominant social
norms. Indeed, Garnett’s reliance on the language of reason is
obfuscatory—religiously motivated physical abuse presents not irrational
desire for ill fortune to befall one’s child, but rather a collision between two
SAFETY CODE A NN . § 167.001 (Vernon 2005); W. VA . CODE A NN . § 61-8D-3a (West
2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West 2005). None of these laws allows an exception
for religiously motivated mutilation.
32
18 U.S.C. § 116(c) (2000).
33
Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education,
and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 118 (2000).
34
Id. at 137 n.129.
35
Id. at 138.
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incompatible nomoi.36 In the nomos of society at large, genital mutilation is
unacceptable; in the nomos of the insular religious community, it is
desirable, perhaps mandatory. In denying the reasonableness of the claim
that the physical abuse of the child should be celebrated, Garnett simply
privileges the dominant social nomos over the insular religious nomos. Put
differently, Garnett has not discovered unanimity on the question of
religiously motivated physical abuse—no such unanimity exists, because
one person’s “abuse” is another person’s “ritual,” “practice,” or “duty.”37
Instead, Garnett has created such unanimity by fiat—anyone who disagrees
is “unreasonable” and therefore can be “ruled out of the conversation.”38
This is not to suggest that Garnett is wrong. Indeed, I believe that
he is quite right, and I take it for granted that laws prohibiting religiously
motivated physical abuse do not violate religious freedom. We must,
however, be clear about what we are doing. To repeat: in refusing to allow
religiously motivated physical abuse, we are privileging the norms of
society at large over the conflicting norms of an insular religious
community. That is, we are rejecting the political liberal conception of
absolute state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good.39 This
36
See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
37
For a rich literary account of the clash between incompatible nomoi—one of
which affirmatively celebrates a death and the other of which is aghast—see WOLE
SOYINKA, DEATH AND THE KING’S HORSEMAN (1975).
38
Garnett, supra note 33, at 137 n.129.
39
The supporter of liberal neutrality may be tempted to reply simply that violence
is different—that a monopoly on the use of violence is precisely what defines the state, and
therefore, of course, remains the exclusive preserve of the state. In contrast, the advocate
of neutrality might assert, education may, but need not, be a state function, and the state
must be neutral among competing conceptions of the good in areas that do not cut to the
very essence of what a state is.
This argument fails on two levels. First, it begs the question: the parents who
circumcise their daughters would insist that they are not employing violence at all. They
are performing a medical procedure and a socio-religious ritual. Of course, the procedure
may cause some pain, but that does not differentiate it from myriad other medical
procedures (e.g., surgery) or social rituals (e.g., playing sports) that we allow parents to
force their children to undergo. To assert that female circumcision is different from
education because female circumcision is violent (as opposed to painful) is to deny that
female circumcision is beneficial to the child, and that denial is already non-neutral.
Second, most liberals are willing to suspend neutrality in some clearly non-violent
cases, as well. For example, few liberals argue that the state has an obligation to be neutral
between racists and non-racists. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (upholding a denial of tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code to a
school because of its racially discriminatory admissions standards). See also Stephen L.
Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 W M . & MARY L. REV . 1627, 1647-52 (1997)
(suggesting that our acceptance of Bob Jones represents a very non-neutral “shared
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is hardly a radical conclusion; a number of liberal theorists have argued
against a strict political liberalism. Waldron has insisted that, “[o]ne does
not, as it were, have to be neutral all the way down.”40 That is, he regards
neutrality “not only as a value that legislators ought to be constrained by,
but also as a value that they ought to enforce (on other people attempting to
exercise power in a nonneutral way). Another way of putting this is to say
simply: in his own behavior but also in regard to the behavior of the people
under him, the legislator is not to be neutral about neutrality.”41 Dworkin
has argued along similar lines: “Liberalism cannot be based on skepticism.
Its constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated as
equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in
political morality, but because that is what is right.”42 Even Rawls limited
political liberalism’s agnosticism between comprehensive doctrines to
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.43 Indeed, Abner Greene criticizes
Rawls for advancing a comprehensive liberalism in the guise of political
liberalism.44 Greene professes to prefer a true political liberalism, which
“acknowledges the equal moral capacity of citizens to pursue their
conceptions of the good .... even those citizens whose theories of the good
are not themselves agnostic in this way ....”45 The devil, however, is in the
footnotes, where Greene acknowledges that, “[o]bviously, we cannot grant
exemptions [from generally applicable laws] in all cases—for example, we
would not exempt someone from murder laws so that she might engage in
the human sacrifice that her religion commands.”46 It is unclear how
Greene can claim to acknowledge the equal moral capacity of the person
who is unable to carry out the demands of her religion because they involve
murder. Clearly, the blanket prohibition of murder, without exception for
religious sacrifice, is a claim that conceptions of the good which do not
involve human sacrifice are better than those which do. Greene’s liberalism
thus may be thinner than Rawls’, but it is not a true political
liberalism—that is, it is not neutral between all competing conceptions of
conclusion that God—this real, extant, and transcendent Creator-God—does not in fact will
racial prejudice”).
40
JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 147 (1993).
41
Id. at 157.
42
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 203 (1985).
43
JOHN R AWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 44 (1996). Rawls has an expansive, but
by no means unbounded, conception of which comprehensive doctrines are reasonable.
See id. at 58-66.
44
Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground, 62 G EO . WASH . L. REV . 646, 667-71
(1994) (reviewing RAWLS , supra note 43, and RONALD D WORKIN, LIFE’S D OMINION
(1993)).
45
Id. at 671.
46
Id. at 672 n.135.
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the good. It draws content from some value other than neutrality—and this
other value remains unidentified and undefended.
Put differently, Greene and Garnett both encounter the same
problem. They both want to avoid privileging the nomos of society at large
over the nomos of the insular religious community. But each is
uncomfortable with some of the implications of that position—specifically,
with the fact that it means that religiously motivated physical abuse cannot
be punished under generally applicable laws. Each, therefore, attempts to
solve this problem by fiat—Garnett attempts to rule the justification of
physical abuse “out of the conversation as simply unreasonable,”47 while
Greene simply notes that, “[o]bviously,” exceptions cannot be made for
human sacrifice.48 Both statements are tucked away in footnotes, and both
are attempts to sidestep the inevitable conclusion. The state must privilege
some conceptions of the good over others. The state must tell some insular
religious communities that some of their practices—practices like female
genital mutilation or human sacrifice—are bad and must be stopped. This
cannot be justified on the grounds of neutrality, and Garnett and Greene
have failed to articulate a non-neutral principle which allows them to
disfavor the practices of some of these communities. Moreover, they have
failed to articulate a principled dividing line between physical harm and
other types of harm. Garnett appeals to consensus on the harmfulness of
physical harm, but, as we have seen, that consensus is manufactured by
Garnett’s “reasonableness” test. Greene simply appeals to the
“obviousness” of punishing human sacrificers, without attempting to
articulate an underlying principle. The language of “compelling state
interests” cannot rescue Garnett and Greene—like the language of
“reasonableness,” it serves only to disguise an underlying (non-neutral)
preference for one conception of the good (the “compelling state interest” in
the bodily integrity of those within the state’s jurisdiction) over another (the
insular religious or cultural interest—no doubt seen by its practitioners as
compelling—in performing their rituals). We may agree or disagree with
the preference, but we should recognize that neutrality has nothing to do
with it.
Having seen that liberal neutrality fails both opponents of Yoder
(like Ackerman and the Mozert court) and supporters of Yoder (like Garnett
and Greene), it remains to consider non-neutral arguments. In the next two
Parts, we will consider the parentalist argument used by Yoder supporters
and the republican arguments put forward by Yoder opponents.

47
48

Garnett, supra note 33, at 137 n.129.
Greene, supra note 44, at 672 n.135
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II. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF PARENTALISM
Those who support Yoder on non-neutral grounds fall into the camp
that I will broadly refer to as parentalists. These thinkers assert that it is
better for parents to control their children’s education, not because parental
control means that the state is neutral between competing conceptions of the
good, but rather because parental control leads to better outcomes than state
control. Parentalist thinkers frequently draw inspiration from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.49 This Part will thus begin
by examining Pierce and suggesting that a different grounding for the
decision could assuage parentalists’ worries without asserting a sweeping
new fundamental right, as the actual decision did. I will then analyze the
arguments of two leading parentalist thinkers—Stephen Gilles and Stephen
Carter—and suggest that they are incomplete because they fail to take into
account the complexity of the web of social value sources.
A. An Alternative Pierce
Pierce involved a challenge brought by two private schools—one
secular, one Catholic—to Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act, which was
enacted by ballot initiative in 1922 and was to go into effect in 1926. The
Act made it a misdemeanor for any parent or guardian to keep his child out
of public school. Its purpose was to “compel general attendance at public
schools by normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have not
completed the eighth grade.”50 The Court, per Justice McReynolds, struck
down the law, holding that it
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.... The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.51

49

268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 531.
51
Id. at 534-35.
50
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Pierce was, of course, handed down at the height of the Lochner era, and
one might be tempted to think that its sweeping assertion of a
“fundamental” right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is
as tenuous as other substantive due process cases of the time. Parentalist
defenders of the case, however, point to the history of the Oregon law at
issue as evidence of the decision’s wisdom.
As Professor Carter has persuasively demonstrated, the compulsory
education laws of the mid-nineteenth century were a reaction to an influx of
immigrants from Europe. These immigrants brought with them “what were
routinely referred to as foreign religions, a term that included, basically,
Roman Catholicism and Judaism.”52 Compulsory education laws were
designed to “Protestantize” the children of these immigrants: “Many states
established their schools with the clear and often openly stated intention of
wiping out the ‘foreign religions.’”53 The compulsory schooling laws had a
“decidedly anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic bias.”54 When many Catholic
parents responded by exiting the public school system and putting their
children in parochial schools, the voters of Oregon adopted the Compulsory
Education Act “with a clear intention of making it impossible for the
Catholic schools to exist.”55 Carter concludes that, “Using the history, the
Pierce holding can be rewritten thus: the state may not use its power to
compel education as a tool for destroying a religion. Phrased this way, the
Pierce rule is one, presumably, that all of us can stand up and cheer.”56
Indeed, one might go even further than Carter and think that the
proper holding in the case would simply have been this: the state may not
target a religion. A law animated by hostility toward a certain religious
group or groups cannot stand. Phrased this way, Pierce starts to look at lot
like Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.57 In that case, the
city of Hialeah, Florida passed a number of ordinances which prohibited
animal sacrifice. The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye asserted that these
ordinances were clearly directed at its Santeria religious practices and
therefore violated its free exercise rights. The Court, per Justice Kennedy,
held that,

52

Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Family Matters, 78 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
53
Id. at 4-5.
54
Id. at 5.
55
Id. at 6. See also Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools:
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1200-02 (1997).
56
Carter, supra note 55, at 1204.
57
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral,
and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest
and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. There are,
of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or
purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious
conduct. To determine the object of a law, we must begin
with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is
that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial
neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernable from the language or context.
Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test
of facial neutrality because they use the words “sacrifice” and
“ritual,” words with strong religious connotations. We agree
that these words are consistent with the claim of facial
discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive. The
words “sacrifice” and “ritual” have a religious origin, but
current use admits also of secular meanings.
We reject the contention advanced by the city that our
inquiry must end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial
neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause,
like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial
discrimination.... Official action that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The
Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility
which is masked, as well as overt.58
The Court looked at the structure of the entire set of ordinances, the
circumstances surrounding their adoption, and their overbreadth for
achieving their purported legitimate state interests59 to conclude that “[t]he
ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”60 Four Members
of the Court also looked to the ordinances’ legislative history and found
evidence of religious antagonism.61 Because the ordinances “had an
58
Id. at 533-34 (internal citations omitted). The “neutrality” referred to by the
Court is not the liberal neutrality rejected above. See supra Part I. It is instead the
requirement that a law prohibiting conduct cannot prohibit that conduct because it is a
religious practice. The justification for the law cannot make reference to the conduct’s
religious significance. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This
“neutrality” does not give rise to the same problems as the liberal neutrality rejected above.
59
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534-40.
60
Id. at 542.
61
Id. at 540-42.
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impermissible object,” were not generally applicable, and were not
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest,62 the Court struck
them down. In essence, the lesson of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye is
that the state may not pass laws motivated by antagonism toward a religious
group, and the courts may go behind the text of a law to discover whether
that antagonism is present.
I submit (albeit anachronistically) that Pierce should have been
decided under the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye standard. What is
compelling in Carter’s account of the background of Pierce is that the law
was motivated by religiously antagonistic motives: the voters of Oregon
were hostile to Catholics and therefore passed a law intended to make it
harder for Catholics to practice their faith. It is the animus—the
intent—that was impermissible, not the effect.63 A 1925 Court applying the
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye standard could have gone behind the
facial neutrality of the Compulsory Education Act, found the religious
animus underlying it, and struck down the law on that ground. In short, the
disturbing facts behind Pierce give us every reason to cheer the principles
relied upon in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, but they do not justify the
sweeping parentalist rights announced in Pierce itself. It will take more
than just those facts to lead us to the parentalist conclusion. In the next two
Sections, we shall examine the arguments of two leading parentalist
theorists to see if there are arguments, independent of Pierce, that prove
more persuasive.
B. Stephen Gilles’ Monism
In his “Parentalist Manifesto,” Stephen Gilles makes three basic
arguments for parentalism. First, the state’s interest in curricular specifics
is sharply limited, and beyond those limits, the fact of religious pluralism
“obliges society to rely on persuasive means to achieve its educational
aims.”64 Second, “parents are more likely to pursue the child’s best interest
as they define it than is the state to pursue the child’s best interest as the
state defines it.”65 And third, “individuals have ... [a] fundamental interest
62

Id. at 524.
In this regard, the appeal by four Justices to equal protection-based reasoning in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was especially appropriate. See id. at 540-42. It is a
bedrock principle of constitutional equal protection jurisprudence that the inquiry focuses
on racially discriminatory intent, not racially disparate impact. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s
Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996) (arguing that laws which single out a group for
disfavored treatment violate the principles of the Attainder Clause).
64
Gilles, supra note 28, at 940.
65
Id.
63
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in nurturing their children and in being nurtured by their parents.”66 None
of these arguments is persuasive.
Gilles’ first argument sounds in the ideal of liberal neutrality
rejected above.67 He seeks a “minimalist understanding of liberal education
on which reasonable people would reach consensus.”68
Again,
reasonableness does all of the work here. He asserts that “[s]urely a
consensus exists in our society that a way of life is unreasonable if it denies
that health, speech, or reason are human goods under ordinary
circumstances.”69 Does any such consensus really exist? We might
command widespread support for the proposition that “health is better than
unhealth under ‘ordinary circumstances,’” but any attempt to define
“ordinary circumstances” would lead to significant trouble. The parent
whose religious beliefs demand that his young daughter be circumcised may
prefer to subject his daughter to serious health risks rather than the risk of
God’s anger.70 The terminally ill cancer patient may prefer a more rapid
deterioration of health to undergoing painful chemotherapy. Still others
might prefer to run serious health risks (or to allow their children to run
such risks) rather than make use of modern medical science.71 Those in the
Deaf movement disagree that “speech”—at least, as we normally use the
word—is better than the alternative.72 There may, likewise, be those who
believe that reason is antithetical to faith and therefore should play no part
or a sharply limited part in education. Gilles achieves “consensus” on these
issues only by ruling out those who opt for the alternative as
“unreasonable.” But his conception of reasonableness appears to be freefloating—it cannot be grounded in neutrality, for neutrality is not meant to
have a substantive component. It cannot be grounded in consensus, for, as
we have seen, its role in Gilles’ theory is to prevent some voices from
counting—this would be the height of question-begging. Where, then, does

66

Id.
See supra Section I.B.
68
Gilles, supra note 28, at 984.
69
Id. at 985.
70
See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the
health risks frequently attendant on female genital mutilation).
71
See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (denying a mother’s
motion to dismiss charges of criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter, felony child
endangerment, and child neglect because she treated her daughter’s acute meningitis with
prayer rather than seeking medical help).
72
See Liza Mundy, A World of Their Own: In the Eyes of His Parents, If Gauvin
Hughes McCullough Turns Out to be Deaf, That Will be Just Perfect, WASH. POST MAG.,
Mar. 31, 2002, at W22 (reporting the story of deaf parents who want their children to be
deaf as well).
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it come from?73 If no satisfactory answer can be given—and none is
forthcoming from Gilles’ article—then even the “minimalist” educational
requirements must be dispensed with. And, as we have seen above, once
one takes this position, then one cannot argue in a principled way for
enforcing laws against religiously motivated physical abuse, either.74
Gilles, like Garnett and Greene, appears unwilling to go down this road.
Gilles’ second and third arguments depart from liberal neutrality and
attempt to provide non-neutral arguments for parentalism. The first of these
arguments is that parents are more likely to pursue the child’s best interest
as they define it than the state is to pursue it as it defines it.75 It is unclear,
however, why the child’s best interest is the sole criterion of a good
education. Is it not an equally plausible position that education should aim
at producing a good society, and when the social interests clash with the
individual interest of the child, the social interests should (at least
sometimes) prevail? Gilles replies that the “revealed priorities of most
people in liberal societies ... [are] family first, citizenship second.... History
teaches that conscious familial reproduction, not ... conscious social
reproduction, is a basic human need for most people in most societies.”76
Gilles presents no empirical evidence for this claim, but, even assuming that
it is correct, it ignores a significant collective action problem. Suppose a
citizen believes that the goal of education should be civic first, individual
second. But this citizen also recognizes that educating her own child for
citizenship will not lead to a good society unless a critical mass of other
parents also educate their children for citizenship. This is a classic
prisoner’s dilemma, and the rational citizen-parent may opt to educate her
own child in the child’s best interest because she recognizes the irrationality
of harming her child in exchange for no social gain at all. Her “revealed
priorities” would appear to be: child first, society second. But if she could
73

The arbitrariness of Gilles’ view is highlighted by the fact that he considers
“views calling for the oppression and subordination of women” to be evidently
unreasonable, see Gilles, supra note 28, at 987, but views which merely regard women as
“unequal helpers of men” are not, see id. at 998. It is left unexplained what principles
allow him to draw such fine distinctions.
74
See supra Section I.B.
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Gilles claims that the best interest of the child is, in fact, a “neutral principle.”
Gilles, supra note 28, at 951-53. However, he makes no attempt to prove this assertion,
and it cannot be taken seriously. Clearly, the best interest of the child standard is not
neutral as between a position that asserts that the child should be educated to be the best
possible citizen and the position that the child should be educated in his own best interests.
These two positions might sometimes conflict, and it is simply not credible to claim that
the best interests of the child standard is neutral between them. I shall therefore assume
that Gilles meant simply to advocate the best interests of the child as the best standard,
rather than as a neutral one.
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Id. at 995-97.
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vote on the issue with the result of the vote to be binding society-wide, she
would vote for civic education first, even if it meant some harm to her child.
By and large, this is how parents vote—local school boards are not rife with
parentalist members promising to allow full parental autonomy over
education. In any case, the “revealed preferences” of parents in their
everyday lives are more evidence of what parents can do (individual parents
can act in the child’s best interests; they cannot singlehandedly act to
reproduce the culture) than what they want done.
This leads to a related critique of Gilles’ second argument. Even if
he is correct that the best interest of the child is the right standard, and even
if he is correct that parents have the stronger incentive to act in the child’s
best interests, incentives are only half of the story. The other half is
resources, most importantly the resource of knowledge. Parents may want
more desperately than teachers to act in their child’s best interests, but
teachers may be better than parents at knowing what those interests are and
how to act in pursuance of them. Gilles cannot claim to promote the best
interests of the child while refusing to consider which actor has the best
access to the resources necessary for promoting that interest.77
Gilles’ third argument might be seen as an indirect response to this
critique. By arguing that there is something fundamental to human dignity
in the transmission of values from parent to child, Gilles might implicitly be
undermining the premise of the resource objection. That is, he might be
saying that it is incomprehensible to talk about the state being better than
parents at knowing or pursuing the child’s best interests, because part of the
child’s best interests lies precisely in receiving that education chosen by her
parents. Gilles argues that the nurturing relationship between parents and
children is central to our human flourishing and that shaping the child’s
values is central to this nurturing relationship.78 Parents “wish our children
to share in the good life as we (diversely) conceive it, to flourish as we
understand human flourishing. To these ends, we seek to pass on to them
77

Gilles concludes that “liberalism treats adults as self-governing in part because
they have the best incentives to act in their own best interests. Consequently, because
individual parents have the best incentives to act in their children’s perceived best interests,
they have a claim to govern their children (and their children’s education) that is closely
analogous to their claim to govern themselves.” Id. at 959-60. By ignoring the question of
resources, Gilles has left the best interests of the child standard behind. Suppose we agree
that parents have the best incentives to act in the child’s best interests but, because of
resource differentials, we think that the state actually does further the child’s interests
better than the parent does. In this scenario, Gilles’ conclusion amounts simply to a claim
that parents ought to have the same dominion over their children as they do over
themselves. Gilles presents no argument for this claim, and it is certainly highly contested.
After all, adults have the right to mutilate themselves.
78
Id. at 962-67.
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not only our fundamental values and beliefs, but also the character to live in
accordance with them.”79 Moreover, parents want their educational
authority to be absolute: “conscientious parents conceive their educational
obligations completely.”80 Noting that it would restrict free speech rights
specifically and liberal toleration generally for the state to forbid parents
from attempting to pass on certain values to their children,81 Gilles asserts
that any state interference in parental value transmission presents the same
problem: “the paradigm of the state battling with minority parents to win
the child’s allegiance is both subversive of parental nurturing and authority,
and counter to the widely held and reasonable judgment ... that the child
needs to receive a coherent education shaped by some controlling
conception of the good.”82
Gilles’ leap from the value of the parent-child nurturing relationship
to the illegitimacy of anything subversive of that relationship is a long one.
Our values result from myriad sources and relationships, and it is unrealistic
to think that one of those sources—albeit a very important one—could shut
out the rest even if it wanted to.83 Moreover, Gilles does not seem to
consider the possibility that there can be conflicting goods—that is, that the
parent-child nurturing relationship can be a good, but so can the relationship
between the child and other sources of value. Gilles’ value monism stands
in stark contrast to our experience of everyday life, where we are constantly
forced to choose between incompatible and incommensurable goods.84
Perhaps the parent-child nurturing relationship is a good that should be
fostered by some means, while other relationships are goods that should be
fostered by other means.85 Neither will completely predominate over the
other, but the mere fact that conscientious parents conceive their
educational obligations completely does not mean that conscientious
citizens might not opt for some sort of compromise.
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Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
81
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Children must leave the house sometime, and this means, at the very least,
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See ISAIAH B ERLIN , The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE C ROOKED T IMBER OF
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See infra Section IV.A.
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In short, once Gilles finishes his argument from liberal neutrality, he
turns to arguments based on the child’s best interest and the parents’ interest
in nurturing the child. He treats these interests as absolutes, admitting of no
compromise with alternative values, but his reasons for so thoroughly
privileging them are unpersuasive. He gives us no reason to think that there
might not be a broader social interest which would justify curtailing strong
parentalist rights.
C. Stephen Carter’s Dissentism
Stephen Carter offers an alternative parentalist rationale that avoids
the particular monism which plagues Gilles’ account. Carter acknowledges
that there is a strong social interest in the education of children, and he
suggests that this social interest is best served by allowing children to grow
up in dissenting traditions. As he writes, “there are important societal
reasons to allow [parents] a degree of control over what their own children
learn. The courts should not cooperate in efforts to make the family, in
effect, an extension of state policy ....”86 An alternative conclusion would
have “totalizing implications,” for it would imply “that the state does after
all have the power to stifle the construction of centers of dissent from its
preferred meanings, as long as it gets to the potential dissenters while they
are children.”87 As an illustration, Carter offers a disturbing story from his
childhood: “I remember my own experience in the public schools of
Washington, D.C., in the late 1960s, during which time I was taught that the
slaves were basically happy and only a few hotheads actually wanted to be
free; most of the slaves, we were taught, wanted kind masters.”88 Carter’s
parents “did not want their children taught that only a few of the slaves
wanted to be free because it was not true.”89 Surely, not only the Carter
family, but society at large would have benefited from wider diffusion of
the truth about slavery.
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STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 174 (1993).
Carter, supra note 55, at 1208.
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Id. at 1223.
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CARTER , supra note 86, at 181. The thesis that most slaves were basically
happy was propounded by, among others, Samuel Eliot Morison, one of the preeminent
historians of his day and co-author of a widely read college textbook on American history.
The thesis was known to be false by the 1950s. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Historian
and Southern Negro Slavery, 57 AM . HIST. REV. 613, 616-18 (1952). Morison removed
references to this thesis from the 1962 edition of his textbook. See I.A. Newby, Historians
and Negroes, 54 J. NEGRO H IST. 32, 41 (1969). However, it is not surprising that there
would be some lag between the removal of an incorrect thesis from college texts and the
time it stopped being taught at the primary and secondary level.
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We can, presumably, all agree that the schools should not have been
teaching this doctrine. It is, after all, false, and I presume that almost no
one thinks that the schools should be teaching falsehoods. The question is,
given that the schools did teach that slaves were happy, what options should
have been open to Carter’s parents? Carter’s own answer is that “parents,
as part of the exercise of their religious liberty, should have a broad
freedom to exclude their children from objectionable programs and teaching
in the schools.”90 Carter thus avoids the monism that plagues Gilles’
theory—he does not ignore the social benefit in education or subsume it
entirely to the benefits to the child and parents. Rather, Carter argues that a
focus on the social benefits of education leads one to appreciate the virtue
of dissent91 and thus to support parentalism, which enables dissent.
But the story of the young Stephen Carter might well suggest a
different answer. After all, Carter’s parents did teach him that the happy
slaves thesis was wrong, and they did not have to pull him out of school to
do so. As Carter writes, “[i]f one dislikes a teaching, one can argue against
it, as my parents did when I was taught in junior high school that slaves
were essentially happy in the antebellum South.”92 Indeed, in responding to
critics who assert the need for civic virtues to be taught in mandatory
schools, Carter asks how they know “that values not taught in schools will
not be learned?”93 The same question may be turned on Carter: how can he
assert that children will not learn to dissent outside of school hours? In fact,
the evidence suggests that they do. After all, as Carter notes, surveys show
that forty-four percent of American adults claim to accept the Genesis
account of creation and another thirty-eight percent believe that God guided
evolution.94 It has been held unconstitutional for public schools to teach
either of those positions,95 and about eighty-eight percent of American
school children are in public schools.96 The conclusion is inevitable: a lot
of school kids are learning about creationism despite the fact that it was not
taught to them in school. In fact, since most public schools teach Darwinian
evolution, one can go further: a lot of school kids are learning to believe in
90
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creationism despite what they are taught in public school. Whether one sees
this as worrisome or welcome, it is impossible to see it as evidence that the
public school curriculum stifles dissent. Children are surrounded by
sources of value—parents, churches, civic groups, popular culture, friends,
school, etc. School is undoubtedly a major influence, but it is not so
pervasive as to prevent dissent from arising. In this light, it is hard to see
the necessity of Carter’s opt-out provision, unless his position is that parents
should be able to pass on their values without having to worry about any
conflicting sources of value. This is not only unrealistic,97 it also does not
follow from Carter’s argument about the social importance of dissent.
Carter’s position would moreover make it impossible for the state to
present children with a coherent message.98 That is, it would make
conscious social reproduction harder, if not impossible. As we have seen,
the presentation of a coherent message by the state does not mean that
children will not learn to dissent from it. But the state’s inability to present
a coherent message may make it difficult to attempt to perpetuate the values
underlying democratic self-government. In the next Part, we will examine
the republican argument against Yoder, which focuses intently on attempts
at conscious social reproduction through education.
III. THE IMPOSITIONS OF REPUBLICANISM
Amy Gutmann has presented the strongest non-neutral argument
against Yoder. I shall term her argument “republican,” because it advocates
“that social and political institutions be shaped and modified so as to
encourage individuals to acquire the civic virtue which will ensure that they
conscientiously fulfil their duties of political participation.”99 For Gutmann,
“[w]ere students ready for citizenship, compulsory schooling—along with
97
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Alan Patten, The Republican Critique of Liberalism, 26 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 25, 30
(1996). See also Suzanna Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1988) (“Amy Gutmann’s Democratic Education might equally well
be entitled Republican Education ....”). Other thinkers, including William Galston and
Stephen Macedo, present a republican vision of education similar to Gutmann’s (although
it should be noted that both Galston and Macedo call themselves liberals). See WILLIAM A.
G ALSTON , LIBERAL P URPOSES 241-56 (1991); STEPHEN M ACEDO , DIVERSITY AND
DISTRUST (2000); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious
Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000).
Although these theorists disagree as to what the content of a civic education should be, they
all agree that students should be educated to be liberal democratic citizens and that this
education requires constraints on democratic decisionmaking. As I show in this Part, that
position is fundamentally untenable. For ease of presentation, I focus here on the
arguments as Gutmann presents them.
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many other educational practices that deny students the same rights as
citizens—would be unjustifiable.”100 The primary purpose of compulsory
education in a democratic society is thus clearly readying students for
democratic citizenship. Of what is this education to consist? Democratic
education must inculcate democratic virtue, which Gutmann understands to
be “the ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social
reproduction.”101 Because the society for which the students are being
educated is a democratic one (and because an authoritarian method of
setting educational policy would surely undermine the democratic virtues
that education seeks to inculcate), Gutmann argues that high-level102
educational policy should be set democratically. There are, however, two
very important substantive restraints on majoritarian decisionmaking: the
principles of non-repression and non-discrimination. Non-repression
“prevents the state, and any group within it, from using education to restrict
rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the good
society.”103 Because the focus is on rational deliberation, non-repression
allows the inculcation of character traits, “such as honesty, religious
toleration, and mutual respect for persons, that serve as foundations for
rational deliberation of differing ways of life.”104 Because “[t]he effect of
discrimination is often to repress, at least temporarily, the capacity and even
the desire of these groups to participate in the processes that structure
choice among good lives,” non-discrimination is the second constraint on
majoritarianism.105 It must be emphasized that Gutmann does not conceive
of these principles as a restraint on the democratic nature of education;
100

AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 94 (rev. ed. 1999).
Id. at 46.
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“Although a school board may establish the curriculum, it must not dictate how
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rather, she sees them as putting democratic constraints on majority rule.106
Indeed, for Gutmann, it is precisely the democratic nature of these
constraints that justifies them.
We may better understand these constraints by seeing how they
function in practice. An analysis of Gutmann’s discussion of the teaching
of creationism in schools will prove instructive. Gutmann argues that
creationism may not be taught in public schools because it violates the
principle of non-repression: “The distinctly democratic problem with
teaching creationism stems from the fact that it ... is believable only on the
basis of a sectarian religious faith. Teaching creationism as science—even
as one among several reasonable scientific theories—violates the principle
of nonrepression in indirectly imposing a sectarian religious view on all
children in the guise of science.”107 It seems safe to assume that Gutmann’s
objection is not predicated on the fact that creationism cannot properly be
called science (i.e., the evidence for creationism108 does not flow from the
scientific method)—if that were her only concern, then the public schools
could drop the name “science” and teach creationism in a class on
“explanations for the natural world.” It seems unlikely that Gutmann would
be satisfied with this merely cosmetic change. Her objection seems to rest
on her claim that teaching creationism imposes a sectarian religious view on
all of the children rather than on her claim that it does so in the name of
science. Indeed, Gutmann writes that, “[i]f democratic majorities in a
religiously diverse society refuse to differentiate between a sectarian and a
secular curriculum, they will unintentionally thwart the development of
shared intellectual standards among citizens, and discredit public schools in
the eyes of citizens whose religious beliefs are not reflected in the
established curriculum.”109 But this cannot be right. As we have already
seen, a large majority of Americans believe either in creationism or in
“guided” evolution.110 Surely, requiring schools to tell the majority that it is
106
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wrong discredits public schools in the eyes of many members of the
majority. And surely the promotion of shared intellectual standards is
accomplished at least as easily—if not more so—by teaching what most of
them are already inclined to believe, rather than by teaching its opposite. At
bottom, Gutmann’s objection to teaching creationism seems to rest on her
intuition that secular reasoning is non-sectarian and open to all, whereas
religious reasoning is sectarian and exclusive. But she does not explain
how she has come to this conclusion. Each relies on its own hermeneutic.111
Each requires a bedrock faith in that hermeneutic.112 We can all think of
cases of believers in the religious hermeneutic convincing believers in the
secular hermeneutic (we call this “conversion” or “finding salvation”) and
vice-versa (“losing the faith”). How, then, can Gutmann claim that the
secular is non-sectarian and open, while the religious is sectarian and
exclusive? Surely, the person who believes that the creation account in
Genesis is literally true would find nothing inclusive about a rule forbidding
the use of his hermeneutic and requiring the use of a competing one.
Gutmann has not shown that teaching creationism is any more repressive
than teaching evolution. It is unclear, then, how Gutmann can assert that
banning creationism from the classroom even if the democratic majority
wants it to be taught is consistent with a commitment to democracy.
I have discussed the evolution example at length because it
illustrates what many would no doubt suspect about a theory like
Gutmann’s: although she claims that her limits on majoritarianism serve
only as procedural mechanisms to promote democracy, they in fact serve to
privilege Gutmann’s beliefs about what should be taught, even in the face of
contrary beliefs by the democratic majority. Indeed, the problem is not
unique to creationism. Whether the curricular topic under analysis is sex
education, critical reasoning, literature, civics, or character education, any
curricular choice will result in the privileging of one hermeneutic over
others, with the corresponding sense by those adhering to the disfavored
hermeneutics that they are being excluded or imposed upon. The principles
of non-repression and non-discrimination, if applied honestly, provide no
guidance with respect to curricular choices. Gutmann’s democratic
restraints on majoritarianism thus fade away, and the principle we are left
with is majority rule in matters of education. This conclusion is
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unappealing to Gutmann,113 but in the next Part we shall inquire whether it
is really so bad.
IV. THE DEMOCRATIC-COMMUNITARIAN ALTERNATIVE
In this Part, I shall offer an alternative analysis of the Yoder
problem. I have termed this approach democratic-communitarian because it
incorporates elements from communitarian political theory to advocate a
democratic answer to the Yoder problem. I shall argue that this approach
can address many of the legitimate concerns raised by the alternative
theories discussed above.
A. The Communitarian Intuition
I begin with a principle to which I have made oblique reference
several times above:114 each of us is the product of multiple sources of
value.115 These sources sometimes work in concert; they sometimes work in
tension; and they sometimes work toward completely different ends. As
Michael Sandel has put it, “Each of us moves in an indefinite number of
communities, some more inclusive than others, each making different
claims on our allegiance, and there is no saying in advance which is the
society or community whose purposes should govern the disposition of any
particular set of our attributes and endowments.”116 Indeed, we might well
characterize the human subject as that being which exists at the intersection
of communal sources of value; to the extent that human subjectivity is
characterized by freedom, that freedom may be said to consist in
manipulating the various value sources into a coherent social identity.117 To
a large extent, of course, human subjectivity is not characterized by
freedom—many of our values are not chosen but are rather taken as given
113
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from one (or more) of our sources of value. Thus, many religious people
would insist that they did not choose their religion—they were born into it
or called to it. Moreover, their religious identity is not something added on
top of their personhood; rather, it is an integral part of their subjectivity.
Certain values cannot be divorced from the subject without destroying that
subject.118 This is true not only of religious believers—many secularists
would insist that their attachment to their family, for example, is both
unchosen and constitutive of their very subjectivity.
Civil and political society are an essential part of this picture.
Indeed, sources of value come in all sizes, from the supra-national to the
individual. In general, it is and should be the case that lower-level sources
of value are thicker than higher-level sources. That is, those sources closer
to the individual (family, church, local community, etc.) present the
individual with a more comprehensive set of values than those further away
(political party, state, nation, international community, etc.).
This understanding that human values have multiple sources which
radiate outward in concentric circles from the individual allows us to
address Stephen Carter’s concern about the totalizing implications of state
educational requirements.119
Hannah Arendt famously analogized
totalitarianism to a “band of iron which holds [its subjects] so tightly
together that it is as though their plurality has disappeared into One Man of
gigantic dimensions.”120
We can understand this to mean that
totalitarianism is what happens when a high-level source of value gets too
thick—its increasing thickness pushes subjects together until their
permissible value set is wholly determined by this single value source.121 It
viciously represses any and all competing value sources and thereby seeks
to destroy diversity. With only one source of value, there can be no space
in which to manipulate values, and any possibility for human freedom
vanishes.122 Because higher-level sources of value tend to have greater
118
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access to the instruments of physical coercion, we more plausibly fear
totalitarianism from them than from lower-level value sources.
However, our fear of totalitarianism must not lead us to restrict the
powers of high-level value sources too tightly. For one thing, their greater
coercive power can act to prevent totalitarian behavior at lower levels (as
when the state takes a child away from an abusive parent or when a
coalition of states removes a totalitarian dictator from power). For another
thing, although danger results when high-level value sources are too thick, it
must be remembered that they are, nonetheless, sources of value. It cannot
be doubted that many Americans consider their Americanness to be central
to their identity and to contribute materially to their values and ideals. No
doubt the same can be said of citizens of other nations. No doubt the same
can be said of many Americans’ state citizenship—plenty of Texans,
Californians, and Vermonters would insist that their state has a distinct
ethos which forms a part of its citizens’ identities.
In order to maintain social order, the higher-level value sources must
be given lexical priority over the lower-level sources; in order to prevent
totalitarianism, the higher-level value sources must be kept thinner than the
lower-level sources. In other words, when dominant society-wide norms
conflict with local norms, the dominant social norms must prevail, but, as a
society, we should be committed to exercising our power to override local
norms only when necessary. The obvious analogy is to federalism: federal
law is supreme,123 but federal lawmaking power is constrained.124
The question, then, is how we can best promote society-wide values
without unnecessary infringements on local values. The best answer is to
attempt to match institutions to the level of value they are best able to
promote. This is, in essence, a “separate spheres” approach—a recognition
that different institutions will have different social roles and will promote
different values.125 Families promote the values important to the family;
churches, synagogues, and mosques promote the values important to their
religions; the promotion of popular culture is left to the market; and state
institutions promote the values of society as a whole. Seen in this light,
schools are ideally suited for the inculcation of social values. Schools are a
place where children from very different sorts of families, religious
its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with those aims”—that is, the
only possibility for freedom lies in the creation of open space).
123
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124
See id. amend. X.
125
See MICHAEL W ALZER , SPHERES OF JUSTICE 6 (1983) (“[T]he principles of
justice are themselves pluralistic in form; ... different social goods ought to be distributed
for different reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and ... all
these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods themselves.”).
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traditions, and ideological backgrounds are brought together and taught the
same subjects. There is no other social institution which brings together all
future citizens of the polity and has the capacity to teach them those
traditions, values, mores, and practices that are essential to their
participation in and reproduction of their culture. Education is thus that
enterprise best suited to the inculcation of the values of higher-level value
sources. In Michael Walzer’s words, “Education expresses what is,
perhaps, our deepest [social] wish: to continue, to go on, to persist in the
face of time. It is a program for social survival.”126 No other institution
could play this role as well, for it is only in schooling that all young citizens
are brought together and taught about their common cultural heritage and
ideals. In short, schools have a comparative advantage in the inculcation of
the values of society at large, just as other social institutions have a
comparative advantage in the inculcation of other sources of value.127
B. The Democratic Intuition
If schools are meant to inculcate large-scale social values, how are
we to determine which values they should inculcate? In a democratic
society, the only answer that can be offered definitively is a procedural one:
the values should be determined democratically. Curricular choices should
be made by the elected representatives of the community or directly by the
community itself. As we saw in our discussion of the republican argument
against Yoder, no substantive restraints on the democratically determined
curriculum can be justified in the name of democracy—such restraints are
always an attempt to entrench the republican’s own preferred curriculum.128
This is not to say that there can be no substantive constraints on the political
process itself—clearly, discriminatory voting rules or rules violating the
free speech rights of advocates of a particular educational philosophy would
make the voting procedures themselves illegitimate. However, once a vote
(whether that vote is a referendum on curricular specifics or, much more
likely, an election for curriculum decision-makers) has been fairly held, any
attempt to limit the substantive curricular decisions would be an
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undemocratic attempt to entrench contested values in the face of majority
opposition.
The question naturally arises: which democratic decision-makers
should determine school curricula? After all, in a federalist system, there
are a number of possibilities. The answer, again, must remain indefinite.
Returning to our communitarian reasoning, it is clear that each level of
government should impose only those restrictions necessary to inculcate the
values shared at that level. The higher the percentage of the curriculum that
is determined by higher levels of government, the more other value sources
are squeezed out by something that, at the extreme, begins to look like
Arendt’s iron band. We can thus imagine that the federal government might
regulate to promote values that are perceived to be integral to American
citizenship—it might insist on basic proficiency in the “three R’s” and some
knowledge of American government and history. State governments might
insist on some state history, and they might approve only certain textbooks
for use throughout the state. Local schoolboards may insist on education in
cultures or languages especially prevalent in the area. They may seek to
teach traditional local customs, beliefs, or skills. They may place a special
emphasis on preparing their students for entry into local industries. The
precise division of power will remain a subject of political contention, for
the relative importance of different value sources is inevitably contested.
This should not worry us unduly—the political safeguards of federalism
will operate to protect lower-level decision-makers from being overpowered
by higher-level ones.129 Indeed, recent years have seen robust debates and
compromises on the amount of power the federal government should
exercise in determining school curricula.130
C. The Democratic-Communitarian Answer to the Yoder Problem
129
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We are now in a position to articulate the democratic-communitarian
position on Yoder. This position holds that Yoder was wrongly decided
because it took educational decision-making power away from the
democratic people and gave it to individual parents and to the courts, which
were tasked with weighing the competing interests of the parents and the
state. In the democratic-communitarian paradigm, judicial inquiry into
educational policy should be limited to two questions: (1) was the policymaking procedure fair and democratic?, and (2) was the policy
impermissibly motivated by animus toward a group or groups?131 As long
as question (1) is answered in the affirmative and question (2) is answered
in the negative, the courts’ role is over. As we have noted, countermajoritarian substantive curricular constraints cannot be democratically
justified.
But what the courts should do is only half of the question. What
advice does the democratic-communitarian view have to offer the
conscientious citizen or politician?132 As we have seen, with a
communitarian view of society comes a fear that too much authority will be
exercised by high-level sources of value. The conscientious citizen is thus
asked to make an honest judgment about how thick the communal norms
are at each level and how much those communal norms need to be
inculcated through schooling. The citizen is asked to keep in mind that the
thickest sources of value will and should be those at the lowest level. This
means that the citizen will want to ponder carefully what social values it is
important to reproduce nation-wide, state-wide, and school district-wide.
The citizen will also want to consider whether some topics should not be
addressed in schools or should be addressed, but with parents having the
option to pull their children out of class while that topic is being addressed.
These decisions will entail a judgment that certain topics are properly dealt
with by extracurricular value sources. The fact that Yoder’s judicially
created exemption from generally applicable education laws was
illegitimate does not mean that a similar exemption could not have been
granted democratically. What was objectionable in Yoder was not the
decision that some students need not be educated past eighth grade—the
proper amount of schooling is a contestable and contested question, and
eighth grade is no more arbitrary a line than any other. What was
objectionable in Yoder was the fact that this contested question was taken
131
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out of the hands of the democratic people and given to individual parents
and courts. A democratic majority may decide not to require education past
eighth grade, just as it may decide not to require sex education or to allow
parents to remove their children from the sex education class. For that
matter, a democratic majority may decide not to require any school at all.
We may think that some of these decisions are profoundly unwise, but there
is no democratic principle which allows us to enshrine our conception of
wisdom in the face of a contrary majority.133
Likewise, a majority may decide whether or not to allow private
schools or home schools to exist. The outcome in Pierce may have been
justified by the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye standard,134 but this does not
mean that a law requiring all children to be educated in public schools that
was passed, not out of animus toward a group or groups, but rather because
of a democratic judgment that all children should be educated together
should be struck down.135 Of course, the democratic-communitarian
standard would counsel a citizen or legislator to ponder long and hard
before passing a law prohibiting private schooling. In order to support such
a law, the citizen would have to satisfy herself that necessary social values
could not be effectively inculcated through regulated private schools. If
they could be, then the communitarian principle of keeping high-level value
sources as thin as possible will require her to vote against the law.
Assuming the people do vote to allow private schooling, the question of
how tightly to regulate private schools will also be up for democratic
resolution.
In short, the democratic-communitarian answer to the Yoder
problem is to suggest that the problem with Yoder was the identity of the
decision-maker. The people may democratically choose to allow the Old
133
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Order Amish to remove their children from school after eighth grade, or
they may choose to require them to satisfy the same educational
requirements as all other students. But there is no constitutional principle
that allows a court to remove this question from the democratic arena. The
democratic-communitarian analysis does, however, suggest that
conscientious citizens and legislators should take seriously a request to be
exempt from generally applicable education laws and should grant that
request unless it would prevent the transmission of what they consider to be
important social values.
D. Objections and Responses
There are three likely objections to the democratic-communiarian
analysis presented above. I shall describe and attempt to respond to each.
Objection 1. Under this proposal, most school districts in the country will
throw out their biology textbooks and teach creationism. This objection
seems to rest upon the large number of Americans who say they believe in
creationism or “guided” evolution.136 There are two responses to this
objection. The first is empirical: it is not at all clear that the democratic
people want creationism to be taught instead of evolution. It is a perfectly
intelligible position to believe in creationism or guided evolution and yet
think that it should not be taught in schools. Indeed, consider the recent
controversy over the attempt to introduce a brief statement about intelligent
design into the biology curriculum in Dover, Pennsylvania. It should be
noted, first, that this statement was in addition to the teaching of evolution,
not instead of it (the same is true of Kansas’ recent decision to include
“challenges to Darwinian theory in the state [educational] standards”137).
That is, a divided school board opted for a compromise on a contentious
issue. This compromise, however, proved unacceptable to the voters. In
school board elections held four days after the end of the trial in a suit
contesting the legality of the intelligent design statement,138 eight candidates
who ran on a slate opposing adding intelligent design to the curriculum
were elected. Not a single candidate who supported intelligent design in the
classroom won.139 In other words, it is not at all clear that voters would
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choose to eliminate evolution from the classroom and replace it with
creationism.140
But the second response must be: so what if they did throw out
evolution and teach creationism? I believe that any school board which
made this decision would be making a horrible mistake, and I would protest
against this mistake with every democratic means at my disposal. But why
should my objection be privileged over the equally strong sentiments of the
majority of my fellow citizens? We have discovered no principle that
allows the entrenching of my minority point of view over that of the
majority—appeals to neutrality fail,141 as do appeals to non-repression and
non-discrimination.142 This is not a question of relativism—I still believe
that my objections to teaching creationism are right—it is simply a matter
of democratic humility. It is easy to be a democrat when one’s compatriots
agree with one’s policy choices, but what allows democracy to function is
that citizens commit in advance to recognizing the legitimacy of democratic
decisions with which they disagree. My objections to teaching creationism
or intelligent design, like my fellow citizens’ objections to teaching
evolution, belong in the public arena. If a fair democratic decision goes
against me, then I will have to teach my children about evolution outside of
school.
Objection 2. The democratic-communitarian analysis allows for the
totalitarian suppression of dissent. It is the simple fact that I can teach my
children about evolution—or creationism or sex or the novels of
Faulkner—outside of school that prevents democratically controlled
education from becoming democratic totalitarianism. We have seen
Stephen Carter’s fear that a democratically determined curriculum with no
opt-out provision for disgruntled parents could become “totalizing” and
suppress dissent.143 But we have also seen that children do still learn things
that are not taught in school (indeed, they still learn things that are directly
140
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opposed to what they are taught in school, as when the young Stephen
Carter learned that slaves were not content in the antebellum South). Value
sources are myriad, and values not learned from one may well be learned
from another. Complete democratic control over one value source (the
schools) is not totalitarian; complete control of one value source over all
others (Arendt’s iron band) is. Moreover, democratic control of education
will likely leave significant power in the hands of parents. If Pierce were
overruled tomorrow, is it plausible that states would rush to outlaw private
schools? Indeed, under the Pierce regime,
No question is raised concerning the power of the state
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall
be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly
inimical to the public welfare.144
Yet most states have very few regulations on private schools.145 The
democratic impulse is not a totalitarian impulse; decisions that can be left to
lower-level decision-makers while still allowing the values of society at
large to be inculcated generally are left to the lower-level decision-makers;
and dissent continues to flourish.
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Objection 3. Under the democratic-communitarian approach, nothing
remains of religious freedom. On the contrary, I would assert that we have
seen at least three important elements which form the core of democraticcommunitarian religious freedom. First, we have the judicial component.
As we saw, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye stands for the proposition
that the state may not target a religious group or groups for disfavored
treatment.146 The Court’s blessing of inquiries that go behind the text of the
law to find animus in its intent gives this principle real teeth. This is a
weighty principle—surely, it is at the very core of what we mean when we
speak of religious freedom that the state may not punish me because I am
Jewish or Muslim or Catholic.
The remaining two elements of democratic-communitarian religious
freedom may not be judicially enforceable, but that does not make them any
less potent. The second is the fact that, in line with the communitarian
intuition discussed above, we do tend to exempt religious groups from
generally applicable laws when we think that doing so will not be inimical
to our attempt to inculcate social values. This takes many forms, ranging
from allowing private education and home schooling to exempting wine
used for religious purposes from the National Prohibition Act.147 These
exemptions indicate a democratic determination that religious belief as a
source of value is important enough to overcome the goal of the otherwise
applicable law. A society’s willingness seriously to consider claims for
such exemptions is an important element of religious freedom.
Finally, religious freedom is protected by our tradition of dissent,
discussed above. The democratic-communitarian theory suggests that
school curricular decisions should be made democratically, but it equally
suggests that family decisions should be made by the family, church
decisions by the church, etc. These institutions can pass on religious values,
and they can serve as focal points for political activism in pursuit of
democratically granted exemptions from laws which the religious group
finds uncongenial. Taken together, these elements form a robust conception
of religious freedom.
V. CONCLUSION
As continuing debates over religion and school curricula
demonstrate, the Yoder problem is still very much with us. This should not
be surprising—it is a difficult problem, necessitating an examination of
some of the deepest principles underpinning our collective life. Thoughtful
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scholars have heretofore put forward four broad categories of arguments
about the Yoder problem. There have been arguments both for and against
Yoder sounding in liberal neutrality; there have been parentalist arguments
for Yoder; and there have been republican arguments against Yoder. In this
Article, I have tried to show that, while each of these arguments raises
important questions and concerns, each of them is also deeply flawed. As
an alternative, I have put forward a democratic-communitarian answer to
the Yoder problem. I have attempted to show both that this answer
corresponds to our communitarian and democratic intuitions, and also that it
is able to address the important concerns raised by the other theories. It is
my contention that the democratic-communitarian theory provides the best
model for how a pluralist democracy can address the intersection of
education and religious belief.
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